the Middle East, and India, 1914–1918," in *Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defense in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman*, ed. Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Portland, 1997), 103–23.

[9] *Empires of the Sand*, 209, n. 22, and McMahon's letter of 30 August 1915 to Sharif Husayn, in George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York, 1946), 415–16. For Kedourie's treatment, see *In the Anglo–Arab Labyrinth*, 69–70.

[10] *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, ed. E. L. Woodward and Rohann Butler, First Series (London, 1952), 4: 340–49. Balfour's general remarks and the material quoted can be found pp. 340–45. The sentence taken by the Karshes is on p. 347.

[11] Hourani, *"Arab Awakening,"* 209–11.

MEHRZAD BOROUJERDI, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996). Pp. 256.

REVIEWED BY MOHAMAD TAVAKOLI-TARGHI, Department of History, Illinois State University

Mehrzad Boroujerdi's *Iranian Intellectuals and the West* explores the works of three generations of Iranian writers and academics who contributed to the formation of a counter-Western "nativist" discourse. It opens with an exposition of the concepts that constitute the theoretical grid of the book and provide the title of its first chapter: "Otherness, Orientalism, Orientalism in Reverse, and Nativism." Informed by contemporary critical theories, Boroujerdi argues for the centrality of the "other" to the formation of modern self-identity. Re-encapsulating the main theses of Said's *Orientalism*, he recounts that "the Islamic world came to be perceived as the embodiment of all that was recently left behind in Europe: an all-encompassing religion, political despotism, cultural stagnation, scientific ignorance, superstition, and so on" (p. 7). He then explains "Orientalism in reverse," a concept formulated by the Syrian critic Sadik al-Azm. Preferring this clumsy concept to "Occidentalism" or "self-Orientalizing," Boroujerdi defines Orientalism in reverse as "a discourse used by 'oriental' intellectuals and political elites to lay claim to, recapture, and finally impropriate their 'true' and 'authentic' identity" (pp. 11–12). As a counter-narrative of Orientalism, this discourse "uncritically embraces orientalism's assumption of a fundamental ontological difference separating the natures, peoples, and cultures of the Orient and the Occident" (p. 12). Boroujerdi attributes the popularity of Orientalism in reverse to the "seductive lure of nativism," which is defined as "the doctrine that calls for the resurgence, reinstatement, or continuance of native or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs, and values" (p. 14). Surprisingly enough, Boroujerdi does not divulge that this seductive and pervasive "nativism" has no discursively significant equivalent in Iranian cultural politics.

Chapter 2, "The Other-ing of a Rentier State," offers a working definition of "intellectuals" (*rawshanfikran*), describes the crisis of legitimization and the intensification of opposition to the Pahlavi state, and offers an account of the causes of the 1979 revolution that highlights the role of the leftist and secular intellectuals. This emphasis on the "secular militants" serves as a disjointed corrective for the remainder of the book, which focuses on "nativist" intellectuals. Based on obsolete historical accounts, Boroujerdi asserts that Iranian intellectuals, unlike their Ottoman counterparts, "only began to consult original European sources towards the end of the nineteenth century." Never officially colonized, he laments, Iran's intelligentsia "never became bilingual or linguistically bicultural as did their counterparts in India, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia." Without a quantitative comparison, he further contends that Iranian intellectuals lacked the secularist commitments of the Turks and the "stamina" of Japanese and Indian intellectuals in the translation of European texts (p. 24).

After these framing presuppositions, Boroujerdi discusses the legitimization crisis of the Pahlavi rentier-state, "a state that derives a substantial portion of its revenue on a regular basis

from payments by foreign concerns in the form of rent" (p. 25). The oil revenues, rather than taxation of the citizenry, contributed to the development of a patron–client relationship and "the gradual erosion of the bonds linking the state and the civil society" (p. 31). Independent from the civil society, the state failed to establish social cohesion via its "royal ideology" and thus increasingly relied on violence. Two political events, the 1953 coup and the 1963 uprising, contributed to the desertion of the intellectuals and their counter-state praxis. Boroujerdi identifies university campuses, underground safe houses, and literary journals as three significant arenas for "the othering of the state." Convinced that the state could not be challenged "through legal and peaceful means," the more radical intellectuals, based in safe houses and enjoying the moral support of college campuses, resorted to armed struggle. Another intellectual sector, the *engagé literati*—consisting of individuals such as B. Alavi, R. Barahini, M. Bihazin, S. Bihrangi, K. Gulsurkhi, G. Saᶜidi, S. Sultanpur, and I. Tabari—used literature as "a means to contest the regime and [to] inculcate popular political consciousness" (p. 43). Boroujerdi casts the remaining Iranian literati as "the literary neutrals," who are in turn divided into "modernist" and "traditionalist" wings. The latter wing consisted of authors such as H. Gulshiri, S. Miskub, N. Nadirpur, Y. Ruᵓyaᵓi, and S. Sipihri. The former wing was involved in the "officially sanctioned culture of the time" and consisted of Persian classicists such as M. Minuvi, P. Natil-Khanlari, S. Nafisi, and Z. Safa. But Boroujerdi does not recognize that the last three of these "traditionalists," in addition to E. Yarshater, who is not discussed, were active members of a progressive intellectual community that was linked to the communist Tudeh Party in the 1940s and that their leftist perspective provided the foundation for their crafting of a secular–nationalist Iranian classical literary culture.

Boroujerdi rightly points out that the recurring themes of Persian literature in the two decades prior to the revolution were "corruption, darkness, fear, hypocrisy, loneliness, nothingness, solitude, and walls" (p. 49). Although these themes did have political valency, Boroujerdi, like other interlocutors of contemporary Persian literature, neglects the fact that these themes articulated the experiences of a generation that rapidly moved from open rural spaces into congested urban settings and enclosed apartments. "Loneliness, solitude, and walls" were the verbal expressions of these unsettling experiences, not merely the symbols of a pervasive opposition toward a dictatorial regime.

In chapters 3 to 7, Boroujerdi offers profiles of ten intellectuals who sought to alter Iran's relationship with the West by critiquing its "Westoxication" (*gharbzadigī*). Coined by Ahmad Fardid and popularized by Jalal Al-i Ahmad, *gharbzadigī* was constituted as the nodal point of a populist discourse critical of Iran's dominant developmental strategy and its subordination to the West. In an attempt to trace the genesis of *gharbzadigī* discourse, Chapter 3 discusses the works of Fakhr al-Din Shadman (1907–67); Ahmad Fardid, who is also known as Mahini-Yazdi (1912–94); and Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1923–69). The sparsity of Fardid's written work has led to his recognition as an "oral philosopher," and Boroujerdi uses this label as a license to erect a detour around his writings. A close examination of Fardid's writings shows that his understanding of *gharbzadigī* was not similar to that of Al-i-Ahmad. Whereas Al-i-Ahmad viewed it as the subjugation to the West of modern Iranian subjectivity, Fardid viewed it as a historical phase exemplifying the hegemony of Greek philosophy. Fardid considered as "Westoxication" St. Thomas Aquinas's application of Aristotelian methods to Christian theology, which he viewed as contemporaneous with the Muslim deployment of Greek logic in theology (*kalām*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*). But Fardid argued that this Greek paradigm (*adab*) was brought to a closure with humanism, which he considered as the universal form of contemporary civilization. Rather than an anti-Western or anti-Orientalist, Fardid's *gharbzadigī* was a conceptual parallel to *Ishrāqī* (Oriental/Illuminationist) philosophy and did not necessarily connote a geographical division of philosophical views.

Al-i Ahmad's definition of *gharbzadigī* was more akin to Ahmad Kasravi's notion of *Urupagarayi* (Europeanization) as a mimetic subjectivity, which Boroujerdi does not explore. In both *Gharbzadigi* and *Dar Khidmat va Khiyanat-i Rawshanfiran*, Al-i Ahmad examined the prominence of a mimetic, consumerist, and conformist subjectivity in modern Iran. Informed by Antonio Gramsci, whom he cites extensively, Al-i Ahmad was critical of the national delusion of ancient grandeur and sought to uproot "all of the ancient institutions with their heavy load of inertia . . . and to use the rubble of those institutions as building materials for creating a new world" (*Plagued by the West*, p. 107). Rather than nativist, Al-i Ahmad's critique of the dominant subjectivity and agency in Iran was similar to and anticipated the research inquiries of Indian *Subaltern Studies*.

Boroujerdi considers Shadman "one of the earliest Iranian statesmen and thinkers to detect the rise of an intellectual enigma with respect to the West" (p. 53). Immediately concerned with the intellectual orientation of dissident intellectuals who contributed to the making of the Islamic Revolution, he conveniently elides the formative phases of the Persianate encounter with the West that began more than a century before Shadman's birth. It was this historical background that informed Shadman's call in *Taskhir-i Tamaddun-i Farangi* in 1948, and not in 1965, as suggested by Boroujerdi (p. 132), for the establishment of a field of inquiry called *Farang-shināsī* (Occidentology or, more accurately, Europology). Having situated this call in "the heyday of nativism and antiorientalism," Boroujerdi concludes: "Shadman, Fardid, and Al-i Ahmad had managed to convince many of Iran's intellectuals that the prevalent social malady was no longer one of 'backwardness,' as thought by their nineteenth-century predecessors, but instead one of 'Westoxication.' As such, instead of promoting wholehearted imitation or catching up with the West, they called for its abandonment" (p. 132). To realize the absurdity of this conclusion, let us recall von Grunebaum's observations in *Modern Islam* (1962). Exploring Shadman's call, von Grunebaum argued that "it seems an important innovation and, if you wish, a significant symptom of acculturation when an Iranian scholar–politician like Dr. Farkr al-Din Shadman . . . calls for *firang-shināsī*, that is, for a study of Western civilization in all its aspects" (p. 235). Von Grunebaum did recognize that Shadman's call was a "defensive measure" and a "pragmatic enterprise" seeking to "capture as many as possible of the achievements and the techniques of the West into the service of Iran" (p. 236). In other words, the phenomenon that von Grunebaum identified as "acculturation" and "innovation," Boroujerdi conversely classifies as "nativism."

These conflicting characterizations are informed by two competing narrative plots. Von Grunebaum's account is driven by a narrative of "Westernization," and Boroujerdi's is a retrospective account that anticipates the Islamic Revolution. It is only within the narrative of a resurgent "Islam" that the works of Shadman, Fardid, Al-i-Ahmad, and other cosmopolitan Iranian intellectuals are reconfigured as "nativist" calls for the abandonment of the West. Detached from the narrative of "Westernization" or the rise of Islam, the works of intellectuals explored by Boroujerdi can be understood as part of a project of *vernacular modernity* involving a dynamic refashioning of Iranian culture. But this hybrid project of self-renewal involved a dialogical engagement with contemporary European culture and civilization. Shadman, for instance, called for a "great intellectual revolution" (*inqilāb-i kabīr-i fikrī*) that simultaneously involved the publication of Persian classics and the translation of the canonical texts of Western civilization (*Tirazhidi-i Farang*, p. 43). Indeed, it was his cosmopolitan interest in an "intellectual revolution" that motivated Shadman's interest in "making Persian eventually capable of accepting, describing, and explaining diverse sciences, technologies and thoughts" (ibid., p. 40). Boroujerdi's assertion that Shadman considered language as the "embodiment of the ageless wisdom of the ancestors" (p. 61) is thus an intentional misreading that re-Orientalizes the linguistic concerns of modern Iranian intellectuals.

Chapter 4, "The Clerical Subculture," chronicles the intellectual and institutional challenges faced by the Iranian clergy and explores Islam's transformation "into the primary agency of political socialization and contestation" (p. 77). Boroujerdi aptly remarks that this transformation was not "so much the traditionalization of modernity but the modernization of tradition." But his account does not consider the pivotal role of the state in the renovation of clerical subculture. The state's policy of mass education increased the readership of religious texts, which historically constituted the highest percentage of books published in Iran. The state likewise played a significant role in the reorganization of the seminaries when in 1934 it transformed the famous Sipahsalar Madrisah of Tehran into the College of Cognitive and Narrative Sciences (*Danishkadah-ʾi ʿUlum-i Maʿqul va Manqul*). Likewise, the use of mass communication by the clergy was prompted as early as 1942 by the state, which actively recruited as radio preachers personalities such as Husayn ʿali Rashid, Muhammad Taqi Falsafi, and Murtaza Mutahari, who later became an Islamist revolutionary icon. This reciprocal relationship was essential to the reactivation of religious subculture in Iran.

Chapter 5, "Lay Religious Intellectuals," offers a close look at the religious city of Mashhad and explores the works of Ali Shariʿati (1933–77), Sayyid Husayn Nasr (b. 1933), and the Islamist Mujahidin-i Khalq organization. Focusing on Muhammad Taqi Shariʿati's Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truths, which was established in Mashhad in 1944, Boroujerdi probes the common beginning of individuals who followed divergent paths of thought in the later decades. Amir-Parviz Puyan and Masʿud Ahmadzadah became Marxist–Leninist ideologues. M. R. Shafiʿi-Kadkani became an academic; Masʿud Rajavi joined the Mujadihin-i Khalq organization; and the cleric Sayyid Ali Khamenei linked up with the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini and finally succeeded him as the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But contrary to Boroujerdi's contention, Mashhad could not be considered "a microcosm of Iranian religious life." A comparison of Mashhad with Qum would show that these two religious cities figured differently in the Pahlavi power structure and provided different modalities of religiosity. Mashhad was much more cosmopolitan than Qum, and its religious elite were less engagé than that of Qum.

In the remainder of chapter 5, Boroujerdi probes the works of Shariʿati and Nasr, and the militant Mujahidin-i Khalq, as representatives of "lay intellectuals" who sought to bridge the fissure that divided the seminarians from their college-educated counterparts. He argues that Shariʿati's notion of "return to the self" complemented Al-i-Ahmad's notion of *gharbzadigī*. Whereas Al-i-Ahmad critiqued the West-adoring Iranian subjectivity, Shariʿati fashioned an Islamist subjectivity that was contemptuous of Europe and European ideologies. Boroujerdi rightly points out that Shariʿati's "return" (*bazgasht*) was a synchronic rather than a diachronic "re-turn." But he neglects to demonstrate that this synchronic "return to the self" was articulated in response to the official promotion of the pre-Islamic past as the essence of Iranian national character and culture. Promoting the pristine Shiʿi Islam as Iran's "present past," Shariʿati conversely dismissed the officially promoted ancient past as a "dead past" suitable only as museum relics. Husayn Nasr's intellectual contributions in pre-revolutionary Iran can be appreciated within the context of these two competing paradigms of Iranian identity. By establishing an essential continuity between Mazdean–Zoroastrian and Islamic Illumiationist (*Ishrāq*) philosophy, Nasr and his colleagues sought to conjoin the temporal divide that separated the cultural heritage of pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran. But Boroujerdi's portrait of this prolific scholar does not attend to his crucial intellectual contributions in pre-revolutionary Iran and instead focuses on his post-revolutionary diasporic writings or his English-language works, which did not figure in the politics of cultural authenticity.

Like his treatment of Nasr, Boroujerdi's examination of Mujahidin-i Khalq is ahistorical. Instead of discussing the views of the founding figures of the mujaheddin and the ideological

transformation of this organization in the pre-revolutionary period, he discusses *Tabyin-i Jahan*, a set of incoherent lectures delivered by Masʿud Rajavi in the post-revolutionary era under radically different discursive conditions. Thus, Boroujerdi fails to explain properly the intellectual formation of the mujaheddin as a hybrid organization that was labeled "Islamic Marxist" by the Iranian political theorist Bizhan Jazani. By conflating the pre- and post-revolutionary pronouncements of Nasr and Mujahidin-i Khalq, despite his theoretical postures in chapter 1, Boroujerdi offers a traditional intellectual profile that is not sensitive to the interplay of power and knowledge.

Boroujerdi's account of lay religious intellectuals is truncated and does not include the most influential of them, Mahdi Bazargan. A serious historical understanding of the strata that activated the clergy and refashioned Islam as a political ideology on par with Marxism and nationalism must encompass not only the contribution of Bazargan but also that of his cohorts, such as ʿAta Allah Shahabpur, the founder of Anjuman-i Tabliqat-i Islami (Islamic Propagation Society); Ghulamriza Saʿidi, a prolific Islamic strategist who was inspired by Indian Muslims; ʿAbd al-Karim Faqihi Shirazi, a physician who edited *Parcham-i Islam* (the Banner of Islam); and Muhammad ʿAli Taqavi, the editor of *Dunya-yi Islam*, which served as the centralizing organ of Islamic associations throughout Iran. These mid–20th-century Islamists crafted a counter-discourse that anathematized both Bahaʾism and communism as Iran's internal–others, while, at the same time, it co-opted their conceptual ideas and networking strategies. Thus, anti-Bahaʾism and anti-communism provided the mechanisms for the transformation of religious piety into dissident political subjectivity. The discourse that is widely misrecognized as "Islamic fundamentalism" was a product of an intricate and protracted process of de-familiarization of borrowed concepts and their re-circulation as Islamic and Qurʾanic terminology. *Vilāyat-i faqīh* is such a de-familiarized concept that it conceals its dialogic relationship to the Bahaʾi concept of *Valī-i Amr*. The organizational structure of religious *anjumans*, *hayʾats*, and *tablighat* centers, which emerged after 1941, were likewise informed by their communist and Bahaʾi counterparts. But Boroujerdi's analysis, despite its theoretical promises in the opening chapter, is oblivious of the centrality of internal–others to the refashioning of "clerical subculture" and the political project of "lay religious intellectuals."

"Academic nativism," chapter 6, explores the works of a generation of Iranian proponents of "anti-Orientalism" and "nativism" who were educated in Europe and the United States and flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. Boroujerdi correctly notes that the Iranian academics' criticism of the West was fundamentally grounded in an ethical judgment "predicated upon a deeply rooted feeling of moral and cultural superiority of oriental civilization" (p. 135). To demonstrate this point, he offers synoptic profiles of Ihsan Naraqi (b. 1926), Hamid Enayat (1932–82), and Daryush Shayegan (b. 1935). Educated in Geneva and employed by UNESCO, Naraqi was a founder and director of the Institute for Social Studies and Research, where he and his other colleagues sought to indigenize social-science research in Iran. Educated in London and employed by the BBC, Enayat was a translator of Hume, Kant, and Hegel, among others, and a professor of political science at Tehran University. With a doctorate from the Sorbonne, Shayegan was appointed professor of Sanskrit and Indian religions at the University of Tehran and was a founding director of the Iranian Center for the Studies of Civilizations. In 1977, Shayegan initiated an international symposium on the "dialogue between civilizations," a concept that has been effectively appropriated by the current Iranian President Muhammad Khatami. Boroujerdi's characterization of these cosmopolitan academics and their hybrid works as "nativist" is as absurd as labeling Said's *Orientalism* as such. Like other intellectuals who are discussed by Boroujerdi, Naraqi, Enayat, and Shayegan broke away from the time-distancing operation that informed early nationalists who viewed Iranian society as temporally behind Europe. Self-confident and critically familiar with Europe, they considered

Iran as contemporaneous with Europe and sought to temporalize Iranian culture and history. This de-colonization of historical imagination was indeed a negation of the nativist presumption of an "authentic" and unchanging Iranian self, which was similar to the Hegelian assumption of unhistorical cyclicality. Shayegan's 1992 self-critical assertion that "we, the heirs of the civilizations of Asia and Africa, have been 'on holiday' from history" (p. 153) is a self-Orientalizing relapse that revives the de-historicizing assertions of early Iranian nationalists.

In "Debates in the Postrevolutionary Era," chapter 7, Boroujerdi seeks "to correct a number of prevalent myths and fallacies concerning contemporary Iranian political culture" (p. 156). He argues that post-revolutionary Iran has "indeed witnessed the prospering of political philosophy and jurisprudence" (p. 157). In his evaluation, "the discussions now taking place in Iran are philosophically sophisticated, intellectually sound, socially relevant, and politically modern." To demonstrate this intellectual vitality, Boroujerdi focuses on the disputes between Riza Davari and Abd al-Karim Surush, who, in the early 1980s, worked together on the purging of the universities and the Islamization of knowledge. The dialogical and topical organization of this chapter is a noticeable improvement over the monological and biographical structure of the earlier chapters. Boroujerdi's expositions here are divided under the headings "Defining the West," "Historicism versus Positivism," and "Tradition versus Dynamic Jurisprudence." Whereas Davari constituted humanism and individualism as the essence of modern Europe, Surush questioned the homogenization and totalization of the West. Whereas Davari advocated a revolutionary detachment from the West, Surush constituted the West, in addition to pre-Islamic Iran and Islam, as constitutive components of modern Iranian culture.

With the controversy surrounding the Persian translation of Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1984, 1985), "falsifiability," "positivism," and "historicism" became potent concepts and labels in post-revolutionary Iran. Boroujerdi's succinct summary of these debates does not include an account of the underlying tensions that made Popper and Heidegger central to the ideological struggles in the Islamic Republic. Aware of Popper's anti-ideology stand, Davari assaulted the translation of *The Open Society* as a clever opposition to the Islamic Revolution and argued that the Popperian philosophy of science is incompatible with revolutionary Islam. But Boroujerdi does not explain that Davari's censure was directed at his own avid Popperian revolutionary colleague, Abd al-Karim Surush. Surush had deployed Popperian terminology in his anti-Marxist crusade in both the pre- and post-revolutionary periods (see his *Naqdi va Daramadi bar Tazzad-i Diyaliktiki* and *Idiʾuluzhi-i Shaytani* [Satanic Ideology]). Inspired by Popper's *The Logic of Social Sciences*, he also wrote *Darshayi dar Falsafah-ʾi ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ* (*Lessons on the Philosophy of Social Sciences*). Davari coined the ironic label "Muslim Revolutionary Popperian" for Surush and his associates, and this, in turn, engendered the similarly ironic label "Muslim Revolutionary Heideggerian" for the Heidegger-inspired Davari, who aspired to articulate a post–Western philosophy. The intellectual conflict between Davari and Surush became more intense and pervasive with the publication of Surush's work on "the constriction and expansion of *shariʿah*" (*qabz va bast-i shariʿat*), which is persuasively discussed by Boroujerdi under the heading "Traditional versus Dynamic Jurisprudence." But this discussion does not illuminate the hybrid ingenuity of Surush's intervention, which I describe in compressed form below.

Applying to jurisprudence, the "externalist" argument in the philosophy and the history of science, Surush argued that developments external to *shariʿa* overdetermine its cognition and its development. Deploying the Kantian distinction between "noumena" and "phenomena," the things-in-themselves and the things-as-they-appear, he argued that our knowledge of the *shariʿa* is not a knowledge of *shariʿa*-in-itself (as intended by God) but a knowledge of the *shariʿa* as it appears to the historically situated spectators and readers. Here Surush used the same intellectual operations that were used in *The Idea of History* by R. G. Collingwood, who distinguished between the *actuality* of the past and its mental "re-enactment" by historians.

Although, for Collingwood, historians could approach the *inside* of historical events through *re-enactment* of the thoughts of historical agents, for Surush, theologians could not play God and claim unmediated access to His intentionality. By displacing the locus of inquiry from the inaccessible essence of the Qurʾan and the *shariʿa* to the extra-Qurʾanic cultural capital that informs juristic expositions, Surush successfully introduced a Copernican Revolution into Islamic theology. Thus, in the Islamic Republic, he opened the sanctuaries of religious knowledge (*hawzah-ʾi ʿilmiyah*) to the scrutiny of contemporary scientific views and promoted a radical rethinking of the curriculum of *hawzah*. Surush's Cartesian turn could not have been more distasteful to the anti-humanist Heideggerianism of Davari and the traditionalist ulama who claimed access to the essence of Islam and the *shariʿa*. Seeking to transcend the humanism of the West, Davari believed that a person who submits to the will of God cannot simultaneously uphold the humanist will to subordinate the world. The political implication of Davari's position against the eclecticism of Surush was transparent. The conservative clerics who viewed themselves as the guardians of authentic Islam joined hands with Davari against Surush and his votaries, who included young seminarians aspiring to gain mastery of the world beyond seminaries. Capitalizing on Heidegger's temporary concord with the Nazis, the disciples of Surush assaulted Davari's "fascist" interpretation of Islam. In this controversy, as in others that included pre-revolutionary Iranian intellectuals, it was not nativism but the hybridization of divergent global intellectual traditions that constituted the hallmark of modern Iranian intellectual history. Nativism as an analytical concept suppresses this hybridity and imposes on that history a fictional homogeneity.

Despite these criticisms, Boroujerdi's *Iranian Intellectuals and the West* is undoubtedly a significant event in the English-language scholarship on contemporary Iran. Boroujerdi introduces an unparalleled theoretical sophistication to the study of this contentious period of Iranian history. This high-caliber work, which has been translated into Persian, is essential reading for those interested in revolutions, Europology, and the modern Middle East.

Fatma Müge Göçek, ed., *Political Cartoons in the Middle East* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publications, 1988). Pp. 152.

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This short collection of essays provides new insights into the medium of political cartoons in the Middle East, where it has long played an important role. Drawing on materials from Turkey, Iran, and Tunisia, contributors "focus on the multiple cultural spaces that political cartoons in the Middle East create across societies" (cover text).

In the introductory chapter, Fatma Göçek argues that cartoons are sites of representation and resistance. How, she asks, were cartoons introduced, received, and integrated into the Middle East? Refuting arguments that cartoons are "primary agents of Western cultural imperialism and alienation" (p. 7), Göçek insists they are sites of negotiation where "many local forms and meaning structures . . . contributed to the transformation of the medium" (p. 7). She stresses that political cartoons in the Middle East draw on existing symbols and characters.

Palmira Brummet's essay investigates how political and cultural paradoxes in the late Ottoman period (1908–11) were represented in female cartoon characters. Many cartoons of this era struggled with contrasts of "East and West, honor and shame, and glory and weakness, to produce a set of visions of the revolutionary situation" (p. 17). Brummet's argument underlines Göçek's stress on the well-integrated nature of cartoons and their reliance on available symbolism. While cartoons were dominated by male figures, Brummet shows how questions of the